The specific reason that the Union soldiers were in Camden was much more important than simple Union campaign. They were there to kill John Chidester, who was a mail carrier that moved to Camden because it was a centrally located place from which to operate his stagecoach lines. He was also a very well known cotton dealer in the city (Quarterly). He became involved in the war when Confederate soldiers came to search his home. They had heard reports of a Yankee postman who was sending messages to the North, and were coming to his house to censor his outgoing mail. While in Camden, the Confederates heard about a Union army that was planning an attack from the countryside (Stark).

The union army, unaware that the south had any knowledge of their plans, began to occupy the city of Camden on April 15, 1864. From the beginning, the Union's generals were confronted by a number of problems. One of these problems was where to find enough forage to feed nearly 12,000 head of horses and mules. As the commissary officers tried to solve the grain shortage, they began to realize that there was not enough food to feed the troops. Since the army was deep in unfriendly territory with no supply line and an active and growing Confederate force to its front, an uneasiness settled over Major General Frederick Steele's headquarters. The commanders established camp and ordered out a foraging party. The soldiers collected hams, cornbread, and other foods from some nearby stores. The commanders also sent scouts out to see if they could find any crops for the soldiers to take over. The scouts heard that there was a large amount of corn from the harvest that was stored in the countryside around Camden. The confederates knew that the unionists were in the immediate vicinity, so they sent out patrols to search out corn houses and burn them. They also burned any other supplies that they knew the Union would find useful.

When the Union marched into the heart of Camden, General Steele's chief of commissary told the Chief Quartermaster that they were extremely desperate for the corn because all of the breadstuffs had been eaten on the march from Little Rock to Camden. The commissary officer said that he wanted at least enough corn to feed the soldiers one-fourth their usual rations of corn meal. He also said that the livestock needed at least half of their rations. The only place to find this much food was a mill, and the only one in the area that the Confederates had not destroyed was Britton's mill. The 36th Iowa Infantry was scheduled to take over this mill on the 17th of April (Bearss 1-2).

While all this was happening, a cavalry patrolling the Ouachita River thirty miles below Camden had captured the steamboat Homer on the night of the 16th. The troopers searched the vessel and realized that it was loaded with 3,000 bushels of corn. The unionists turned the vessel around and took the provisions to its starving army. Things were really beginning to look good for the Union. They would later realize that some of their good fortune might have caused them to let their guard down (Bearss 2).

On the 16th, General Steele was notified by some of his scouts that there was a large supply of forage stored near the upper section of Washington road, which was fifteen miles west of Camden. Even though the Union had just taken the cargo ship, General Steele was highly excited about the news. He told one of his commanders, Captain Henry, that he wanted him to organize a train with a strong escort to secure the corn (Bearss 1-4). Henry assembled a group of troops that contained an infantry regiment (1st Kansas Colored Infantry) and two hundred cavalry troopers. He also had an artillery section go with the soldiers as an escort (Glatthaar 51). General Thayer, the officer in charge, filled in Colonel James Williams, the commander of the Colored Infantry on what was going on. Thayer told Williams that it would be wise to have his cavalry patrol all of the roads along the line of the march. He believed that this would give Williams a timely warning so that he would not be ambushed. Williams sent out a group of soldiers, and the coast appeared to be clear. At 5 a.m., April 17, the escort and train met in front of General Thayer's headquarters in Camden. The forage-master told Colonel Williams that the 198 six-mule wagons were ready to go (Bearss 6).

The Confederate patrols found out that the Union was making their way to the corn at Poison Springs. They burned about half of the estimated five thousand bushels that the scouts had mentioned to General Steele. The unionists did manage load up 141 of their wagons. They were back to their camp and out of danger by midnight. On their way back to the countryside of Camden, the soldiers were met by a group that was sent by the General Steele to escort the corn back (Bearss 6).

During all of this, the Confederates were planning how to stop the forage train before it got back to the soldiers camping on the outskirts of Camden. The Greyclads had fought a battle with General Steele's guards on the 15th, so they knew exactly where the unionist had set up camp. General Marmaduke, the commander of the Confederate forces, had been campaigning with his troops, so he wanted them to rest before they had to go into a serious battle. The Confederates were also outnumbered at this time, and had been given direct orders to stay undercover and wait for developments. Marmaduke only had five hundred men, and they believed that the Union had an estimated twenty-five hundred. They sent for a thousand more troops and readied themselves for the next day's battle (Bearss 26).

By sunrise, General Marmaduke had his soldiers on the road to the White Oak Creek Bottom, where he heard that the forage train had camped for the night. By 9:30 a.m., Marmaduke's scouts had spotted unionist patrols. He had gotten orders earlier that morning to make sure that the forage train did not make it to General Steele and the rest of the Union troops. Marmaduke decided that the best time to attack would be now. The forage train was being trailed by two regiments of soldiers that guarded the wagons against any attack from behind. There was one regiment of soldiers and a group of cavalry guarding the front. Marmaduke sent three regiments of soldiers ahead of the forage train on the south side of Washington road. Then, he sent an artillery regiment with two cannons along the north side of the road. This left him with over seven hundred fifty soldiers that he would use to attack from the back. Union scouts swiftly traveled back to the forage train and told Colonel Williams about Marmaduke's intentions. Williams immediately stopped the train and began preparing his soldiers for battle. Not knowing that he was outnumbered, he put two regiments at a ninety degree angle along the back of the train. He then sent his infantry to the front of the train to look out for a surprise attack (Bearss 31-32). For about a half hour, there was a stalemate between the two forces. Marmaduke had his cannons set on top of a hill to the north of Washington road. Colonel Williams knew that the Confederates had the ultimate position, but instead of fleeing, he aimed his cannons directly at Marmaduke and his troops. Williams fired a cannon at the Confederates, and the battle began. Williams, knowing he was not prepared, had not intended for this cannon blast to spark the battle. He knew that the cannon would not injure the Confederates at all. He was only using it to bluff them and to arouse the rest of the Union troops that were resting and filling their canteens at the spring (Bearss 35-37). Williams and his group of soldiers were outnumbered and outdone on this day, the day of April 18, 1864. His soldiers were massacred, and the forage train never made it to the needy soldiers in the countryside of Camden (Glatthaar 51).

Many factors aligned for the South to have such a lopsided victory at Poison Springs. One of the major factors was the overwhelming number of Confederates who came in response to false scouting reports. They were under the impression that the Union was twenty-five hundred strong, consisting of a regiment of cavalry, three infantry battalions, and two pieces of artillery. The Confederate scouts said that they heard from "reliable" sources that Bluecoats were armed and ready for battle, when, actually they were exhausted and starved. Thinking that they were outnumbered, the Confederates, who were originally only fifteen hundred strong, had sent for reinforcements, As a result of this troop activity, they had far more men than the Union army.

In addition to having more soldiers, the greyclads were also more prepared for battle because they believed that they were the underdogs. This is probably one of the main reasons that they Union had no chance against the Confederacy. When someone is trapped with their back against the wall, they will come out fighting for their life. The Confederates feared for their lives and thus came out fighting more tenaciously than ever.

Another reason that the unionists had no chance of winning in a battle with the federals was that they were suffering from starvation and exhaustion. When the Union had its first confrontation with the Confederates, they were at the end of multiple day march. The Confederates, on the other hand, were pretty rested because they had camp set up in Arkansas for over a month. They had already discovered all of the corn cribs and mills that were in Camden. They had full rations with surplus. The unionists only had one fourth ration, and that was with their food situation at its best. When it was time for battle, many of their soldiers were not even fit to fight. This exhaustion and supply shortage, combined with the other factors, allowed the Confederacy to annihilate the Union forces in the Battle of Poison Springs.

With these decisive advantages, the Confederacy thwarted the Union troops at the Battle of Poison Springs, ensuring the Southern control of the Ouachita, a main transportation vein to Central Arkansas. By giving the Confederates complete control of the Ouachita River, the battle provided a short- lived opportunity for the Southern Arkansas divisions of Confederate forces to regroup and continue the war. As a tributary of the Arkansas River, the Ouachita provides access to several cities in the county and several other parts of Southern Arkansas. With supremacy of the river, the Confederates were able to regulate what went in and out of the state. Even though, their victory at Poison Springs was short lived, it did give them temporary control of the river, thus impacting the Civil War.